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Most see having their individuality stifled as equivalent to the terrible forced conformity found 
within speculative fiction like George Orwell’s  1984 . However, the oppression of others by those 
in power has often been justified through ideologies of individualism. If we look to animistic 
traditions, could we bridge the gap between these extremes? What effect would such a 
reevaluation of identity have on the modern understanding of selfhood? The term ‘ in dividual’ 
suggests an irreducible unit of identity carried underneath all of our titles and experiences—the 
real self. By linking Marilyn Strathern’s elaboration of  dividualism and Nurit Bird-David’s 
relational epistemology , a clear contrast forms between the animistic sense of self and that of the 
West. This system of selfhood more readily encourages a life lived in Henri Bergson’s sense of 
duration and sets up a state of  dialogical discourse , as seen in Mikhail Bakhtin’s work. These 
concepts challenge the traditional praise for individuality and exposes how individualism can be 
used as a tool of marginalization as seen in Michel Foucault’s critique of  authorship . I argue that 
pursuing a sense of self rooted in these concepts instead of individualism mitigates this 
marginalization via a more socially aware cultural environment that the traditional Western sense 
of self fails to create.  
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People take for granted the concept of an  individual  self that is profoundly distinct from 
those around them. The term  in dividual suggests that who we are is an irreducible unit of identity 
carried underneath all of our titles and experiences—the  real self. While many have challenged 
this idea in the past, a habit of compromise instead of revolution has prevented the fullest 
realization of alternative ways to imagine personhood. Most see having their individuality stifled 
as equivalent to the terrible forced conformity found in speculative fiction like George Orwell’s 
1984 . 
 
Fig. 1 & 2. Stills from the film  1984 , Directed by Michael Radford (1984) 
However, throughout much of Western history we can see examples of individuals asserting 
selfish dominance and exclusion over others while often justifying such behavior through an 
individualistic ideology. Can we bridge the gap between these two extremes? What effect could a 
conscious and deliberate reevaluation of selfhood and identity through the lens of  dividualism 
and  relational epistemology have on the modern understanding of selfhood? 
Marilyn Strathern clarifies McKim Marriott’s notion of  dividualism as a sense of 
composite identity comprised of distinct and interrelated parts with, most importantly, no one 
aspect having dominion over the others. This alternate sense of selfhood arises in what Nurit 
Bird-David calls  relational epistemology , or understanding the world as made up of relationships 
and doing so from a fluid point of view that is defined by those relationships. Such a system of 
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thought and selfhood more readily encourages a life lived in Henri Bergson’s sense of  duration 
and sets up a state of  dialogical discourse , as seen in Mikhail Bakhtin’s work. When taken 
together, these concepts challenge our tacit acceptance of individuality as laudable and exposes 
how individualism can be used as a tool of marginalization as seen in Foucault’s critique of 
authorship . I will argue that pursuing an alternative sense of self rooted in  dividual identity 
through a  relational epistemology inspired by animistic worldviews mitigates this 
marginalization via more a socially aware cultural environment that an individualistic approach 
lacks. 
Dustin Yellin’s  Psychogeographies series will serve as an artistic representation of the 
concepts discussed here. Each sculpture consists of life-sized human forms made up of layered 
photos, shapes, and colors bound within blocks of laminated glass sheets. 
 
Fig. 3-5.  Psychogeographies 58 , 55 , 45 , Dustin Yellin (2014) 
There is no singular outline or primary image defining these figures. They are the aggregate of a 
seemingly countless number of images and forms—an apparent coalescence that in actuality 
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lacks any finalizable unity. These are astonishingly appropriate representations of the 
constellation-like structure of  dividual selfhood. 
In order to grasp the value of  dividualism and  relational epistemology , we must 
understand the anthropological background of the terms. Developed in the 1970s and ’80s, 
dividualism is reflective of the postmodern sentiments of the time and directly contrasts the 
Western sense of individualism. While coined in 1976 by McKim Marriott during his study of 
South Asian cultures, it was Marilyn Strathern’s application of the term to Melanesian society in 
1988 that led us to consider it philosophically.  
 
Fig. 6. Illustration of dividual identity 
In this system of selfhood, there is no core to a single person—no single feature that defines 
them in a manner more ‘true’ than any other. What we might refer to as the self is nothing more 
than the overlap of all of the titles, experiences, biologies, and so on of a single person. They 
exist not as a subject held within a web of being, but as the very web itself. Strathern is 
exceptionally harsh in her critique of previous scholars’ application of Western-centric 
metaphysical concepts to non-Western peoples and pursues her study of Melanesian peoples 
through cultural relativism. By situating Melanesian culture as distinctly outside of the Western 
tradition, it was easier to to let go of the presumed primacy of individualism inherent in Western 
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thought of the time. In the absence of such presumptions,  dividualism can more readily be 
considered valid instead of unreasonable. 
Her observations of Melanesian culture revealed people who “contain a generalized 
society within” and are “frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the 
relationships that produce them.”  People are not forced under the umbrella of a singularly 1
defined society that they either do or do not match. Instead, the collective group is defined by the 
sum of its population as a holistic reflection of each person in the same way that each of them is 
a holistic reflection of their own experiences and attributes. In short, both the self and one’s 
culture take on a  dividualized web-like structure. Strathern casts the “cultural construct” of 
individuality as the “embodiment of social relations” and identifies ‘society’ as “a unifying force 
that gathers persons who present themselves as otherwise irreducibly unique.”  Here, ‘society’ is 2
a dualistic term that implies a collectivism through cooperative individualism. Those within 
societies “are imagined as conceptually distinct from the relations that bring them together” 
while emphasizing the commonality of societal unity over all else.  Plural relations within the 3
self are transformed into dualistic relations as that which identifies with societal unity takes 
precedence over other parts of one’s identity in an act of domination.  4
Nurit Bird-David’s work in Southern India regarding  relational epistemology provides 
the larger conceptual framework for such personal and societal dynamics while also hinting at 
the animistic roots of such a system. This is the foundation of her efforts to rehabilitate Western 
understandings of animistic worldviews which have historically been seen as nothing more than 
1  Marilyn Strathern,  The Gender of the Gift : Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia , 
(University of California Press: Berkeley, 1988), . p. 13. 
2 Ibid., p. 12. 
3 Ibid., p. 13. 
4 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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“failed epistemology.”  When viewed through the lens of  relational epistemology , the animistic 5
practice of ascribing personhood to objects is a reflection of how all levels of personhood are 
derived through a series of relationships that build up between each other.  Dividuation is key to 
acting within a  relational epistemology as she describes with noteworthy elegance. 
I am conscious of the  relatedness with my interlocutor  as I engage with her , 
attentive to what she does in relation to what I do, to how she talks and listens to 
me as I talk and listen to her, to what happens simultaneously and mutually to me, 
to her, to  us .  6
 
 
Fig. 7. Stills from  The Conversation , Lucea Spinelli (2016) 
This work serves as an illustration of personal interaction within a relational epistemology. 
Both people are seen as part of a multiplayer unit of identity actively developing due to the 
interactions of its parts without the need for any sort of cohesion. These two concepts do not just 
5  Nurit Bird‐David, ‘“Animism” Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational Epistemology’, [The 
University of Chicago Press, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research],  Current anthropology , Vol. 
40, no. S1, February 1999, p. S67. 
6 Ibid., p. S72. 
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pair together to form a widely applicable epistemological system. They offer a fresh perspective 
on an issue that is quietly present throughout the work of many Western philosophers. 
Bergson’s concept of  duration is a clear example of this. In short, it suggests that our 
sense of distinct life events that can be isolated from one another is nothing more than an illusion 
for the sake of rationality.  Consider Bergson’s analysis of one’s view of their own personal 7
history. We tend to imagine life events as separate and distinct units lined up chronologically. If 
this is so, then there must be something binding these events together in order to form a relation 
of some kind. The  ego is imagined as a ‘string’ running beneath these segments of time in our 
personal history.  This is our individual self—the truest aspect of our identity that is present 8
within each event and tieing it to our sense of being. While we may default to this understanding, 
how do we know that our immutable individuality is present  within these events? Why would it 
not be intrinsically part of them, influenced by them, and therefore changed? If  duration is 
entertained as a valid concept, how could our individuality be eternal and absolute if it is in a 
constant state of becoming?  
In broader human history, the same ideas spreading from culture to culture over time are 
always influenced by the previous ideas of the receiving culture. Ideas do not move about as pure 
concepts from moment to moment or place to place. They always change. If this is so, then why 
would one’s idea of who they are and what defines them in most absolute sense not follow the 
same pattern of change? Could individuality simply be a symbol contrived in order to make 
sense of one’s personal history; “an artificial imitation of the internal life” meant to make the 
haze of life rationally intelligible?  The influence of one’s personal history upon itself is 9
7  Henri Bergson,  Creative Evolution , (The Modern Library, 1944), . p. 4. 
8 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
9 Ibid., p. 6. 
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analogous to that of others upon the  dividual self when viewed within a  relational epistemology . 
Fuzzy logic takes over as nothing is ever isolated and the entirety of one’s life and self enter into 
a state of flux. If we return to Yellin’s work, we can further see how he visualizes this Bergsonian 
notion of the self, albeit in a fixed state. 
 
Fig. 8-10.  Psychogeographies 41 , 54 , 61 , Dustin Yellin (2013-14) 
There is no ‘core’ to each figure, no singular ego upon which the form is built. Each is a 
cacophony of images analogous to the momentary events of one’s life. This is the messy and 
difficult to define reality that lies beneath the illusory order of individuality. So, what happens 
when two of these  dividual entities meet and begin affecting each other? 
Bakhtin's notion of  dialogical ideas , as developed through his analysis of Dostoevsky's 
‘polyphonic’ style of novel, bridges the gap between  relational epistemology and  duration 
through a sense of continual development and exchange. In a  dialogical  discourse , ideas are not 
defined by an immaterial and external entity but by those who embody and live through them as 
a vital aspect of their identity.  They grow and mature through interactions with others and their 10
10  Mikhail Bakhtin,  Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics , (University of Minnesota Press, 1984), . pp. 5–7. 
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embodied ideas.  This interaction in a state of equilibrium, as seen in works like  The Brothers 
Karamazov , is in opposition to a  monological progression where many possible truths are 
dialectically synthesized into one. 
 
Fig. 11. Selection from the  Illustrated Brothers Karamazov , William Sharp (1945) 
Monologism  reduces all ideologies into either true or untrue based upon a certain worldview and 
reinforces the idea of a unified consciousness.  This is the same mechanism identified by 11
Marilyn Strathern in her assessment of the domination of ‘society’ and runs counter to 
Dostoevsky's work. 
Instead,  dialogical discourse allows a person to enter a constant state of becoming with 
limitless potential  through his or her interactions with others—the dialog between them.  Even in 
agreement, these  dialogical  ideas never merge into a unified one. They are in a constant state of 
development like the characters who embody them.  Not only does this reinforce Bergson’s 12
11 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
12 Ibid., p. 95. 
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notion of  duration , but it shows how the mechanics of  relational epistemology guide the 
development of  dividual selfhood. It is the web of relationships we form, both with others and 
within ourselves, that make us who we are, shape our understanding of the world, and allow for 
constant creation and development. 
These concepts challenge our tacit acceptance of individuality as laudable and expose 
how it can be used as a tool of marginalization. To better understand this implication, we need to 
look to Foucault’s critique of  authorship as a tool of punishment.  Authorship is reliant on 
individuality being accepted as a naturally valid state of selfhood and has little connection to the 
functional reality of the work produced. Collecting works under a single  author  reflects the 
assertion of “a relationship of homogeneity” that acts as a verbal shorthand and indicates a 
special ideological discourse.  13
Ascribing  authorship to something establishes ownership of the mode of thought present 
in the work. That mode of thought can now be linked to a single person who can thus be 
punished or praised for whatever real or perceived impact they may have. The insidious aspect of 
this is how  authorship in conjunction with individualism fashions explanations for deviant 
modes of thought.  To destroy a thought is terribly difficult if not impossible. There is no 14
material object to contain its influence.  Authorship solves this problem by attaching a person to 
the thought as its sole representative, as its source. The author’s individual history is seen as 
intrinsic to the work—above all other influences—as part of their expression. This allows for 
their ideas to be seen as reflecting an individual worldview that can readily be dismissed. The 
ideological discourse within the work is isolated from representing wider society or even 
13  Michel Foucault, ‘What Is an Author?’, in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds.),  Art in theory 1900-2000: An 
Anthology of Changing Ideas , (Blackwell Publishers: Malden, 2002), p. 950. 
14 Ibid., p. 952. 
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humanity. It belongs solely to the  author who can now be branded as a radical madman or heretic 
disconnected from their own culture. 
Relational epistemology and its promotion of  dividualism  challenges the validity of 
punishment and dismissal via  authorship  as one person cannot logically be blamed for ideas that 
are a reflection of others in society. Foucault argued that much of human history was made up of 
ideological constructs that did not necessarily reflect reality, or “stories we have made up in 
order to make the world intelligible and acceptable.”  If we follow Foucault’s Bergsonian 15
suggestion that such constructs exist simply to make the world “intelligible and acceptable,” then 
who is to say that the individual self is a naturally occurring part of human selfhood? In fact, we 
see how it benefits the status-quo to promote individualism as a means of isolating people from 
one another. Even collectivist societies require a forced individuality that represses divergent 
aspects of a person for the sake of emphasizing commonality, as Strathern pointed out in her 
work. Embracing a  relational epistemology would lead people to pay close attention not to their 
singular role in the world around them, but to their effect on others and  vice versa . If we return to 
Yellin’s work for a moment as a metaphor for the  dividual self, his use of collage can be 
recognized as immensely valuable. 
15  Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen Marie M. Higgins,  A Short History of Philosophy , (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 1969), . p. 303. 
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Fig. 12.  Psychogeography 43 , Dustin Yellin (2014) 
These images from popular culture layered within his constellations of the human form 
symbolize how a person is constructed from every experience and relationship they have. The 
self is never isolated from the people or objects that surround it. It is a self-affective living 
archive of those things, people, and events. When comprehending others in this way, 
consideration of the impact of one’s actions would be essential and deviant behavior would 
prompt investigation of the perpetrator's cultural and the spatiotemporal conditions instead of the 
isolated history of one person removed from society by their irregular behavior. Through a 
dividualistic sense of self, that behavior would be seen as the result of numerous relationships 
building up the person’s identity over time and, equally, capable of rehabilitation through further 
positive relationships. 
This paper is not an attack on the influence of biological factors on the development of 
human consciousness like DNA and physical irregularities or impairments in the brain. Such 
factors would be part of the internal  dialogical discourse of the self and merit further study. This 
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is also not a broader argument on one side of the nature versus nurture question. The goal of this 
paper is to present an animism-inspired alternative to Western culture’s acceptance and praise of 
individuality that better serves a stable and inclusive environment encouraging all manner of 
identities and their collaborative development. 
This idea of recognizing the humanity and value of people we interact with is a strong 
theme within Western philosophy. The fact that the concepts of  relational epistemology and 
dividualism were pioneered in the study of non-Western cultures, yet are applicable within 
Western philosophy, speaks to their potential in analyzing the basis of human selfhood and its 
development beyond cultural boundaries. These are concepts based within humanity’s shared 
history as an object-oriented species and the intuitive value/power we ascribe to those objects. 
Bergson and Bakhtin’s complementary concepts of  duration and  dialogical ideas  are emblematic 
of how  dividualism and  relational epistemology not only fit into many lines of discourse within 
the Western tradition, but also enhance them. Foucault’s critique of  authorship within his larger 
body of work regarding societal marginalization provides evidence of how the individualistic 
model is ripe for exploitation by those who succumb to narcissistic tendencies. 
Entertaining this alternative view of selfhood as dependent on relationships with others 
creates a sense of self emphasizing community more effectively than a unified society of 
individuals. When the self is a result of relations and interactions, acts of altruism and 
compassion no longer require triumph over the individual self. Such behavior becomes natural 
and encouraged as the very fabric of one’s identity is interwoven into the way he or she engages 
with others. The exploitation of others is then equal to the exploitation of the self and the 
negative effects of such behavior would be recognized as damaging to both parties. Such an 
 
Societies Within     13 
increase in personal responsibility benefits everyone in society and is worth pursuing as it limits 
potential marginalization and provides a strong and clearly identifiable counter to rampant 
individualism and its negative impacts.  
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